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ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED HUB CARRIER "SLOT"
PREFERENCE AT CHICAGO O'HARE
ERIN SHEA*

HE RIGHT TO USE a runway, or to take-off and land at an
airport, is called a slot.1 "Slot means the operational authority to conduct one IFR landing or take-off operation each day
during a specific hour or 30 minute period at one of the High
Density Traffic Airports. "2 At certain airports with a capped
number of slots, they are not only essential but also extremely
valuable to airlines. Where slots are capped, "owning" a slot
means that you can use the runway and your competitor cannot.
At O'Hare International Airport, an airport with limited or
capped slots, the airline industry is fighting over slot allocation.
The current fight at O'Hare airport has important implications
for the aviation industry, large hub carriers, small carriers (or
limited incumbents and new entrants), and consumers. If hub
carriers get a preference in slots at O'Hare, it could compel
those carriers to continue to contribute to the airport's multibillion dollar expansion and may have implications for other airports looking to expand. If hub carriers do not get a preference, it may give new entrants a chance to compete (and smaller
carriers a chance to expand) at one of the biggest airports in the
country. And if this drives down prices, consumers will certainly
take notice.
There could be even larger implications, too. If hub carriers
lose the battle at O'Hare, their investment (billions of dollars)
in the O'Hare expansion might be viewed as fruitless, and those
airlines could withdraw support and put the expansion in

jeopardy.
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2009; B.A., Colorado College, 2003. The author would like to thank her parents,
Mike and Jane Shea, for their constant love and support, and her grandfather,
Jim Shea, for sharing his love of the law.
1 14 C.F.R. § 93.213(a) (2) (2008).
2 Id.
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I.

HISTORY AND USE OF LANDING SLOTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

SLOTS GENERALLY NOT RESTRICTIONS

Most airports in the United States have operated and continue to operate without slot restrictions.' In fact, save for a few
highly congested airports, "first come-first serve" has been and is
currently the U.S. system for allocating slots.4 Gate availability,
terminal space, and air traffic management requirements limit
the number of aircraft with rights to land at an airport. 5 "The
aircraft of airlines who have the rights to gates simply queue up
on the taxi-ways and await their turn to take-off. Incoming aircraft are either stacked up overhead or delayed at their origination points."6
Hence, slots traditionally had no value because limitations on
a carrier's ability to take-off and land came from other sources
(air traffic management requirements and technical restrictions
such as the availability of terminal gates).' But the "first comefirst serve" system became unworkable at highly congested airports. The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") began instituting flight caps at these airports by managing and restricting
slots. 8 The FAA's slot controls came in the form of the "highdensity rule."9
B.

THE HIGH-DENSITY RULE: SLOT RESTRICTIONS

In 1968, congestion at several U.S. airports emerged as a
problem demanding attention and intervention.' ° The most
congested areas were Chicago, New York, and Washington, spe3 Loan Le, George Donohue & Chun-Hung Chen, Using Auction-Based Slot Allocation for Traffic Demand Management at Hartsfield Atlanta InternationalAirport: A
Case Study, 2005, at 3, http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu/pubs/AuctionPaperTRB2005.
pdf.
4 See Robert Hardaway, Economics of Airport Regulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 47, 60
(1991). But see Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges, 73 Fed. Reg. 3310
(Jan. 17, 2008) (proposing fee pricing which would use variable landing fees to
encourage carriers to use runways at less congested times).
5 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 60; Le, Donohue & Chen, supra note 3, at 3.
6 Hardaway, supra note 4, at 60.
7 See Le, Donohue & Chen, supra note 3, at 3.
8 John Sabel, Airline-AirportFacilitiesAgreements: An Overview, 69J. AIR L. & Com.
769, 779 (2004).
9 Id.
10 See Dario Maffeo, Slot Trading in the Reform of the Council Regulation (EEC) No.
95/93: A ComparativeAnalysis with the United States, 66J. AR L. & Com. 1569, 1572

(2001).
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cifically John F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, Newark International Airport, Chicago O'Hare
International Airport, and Washington National Airport." To
address the congestion at these airports and the corresponding
discontent on the part of the carriers, passengers, and the federal government, the FAA proposed special rules that would ap2
ply to airports it designated as "high-density" airports.'
These rules proposed to limit the number of Instrument Flight
Rule (IFR) operations (takeoff and landings) permitted per hour
and to require that each operation be supported by a "slot." The
FAA proposed to allocate the hourly IFR reservations or "slots"
among three classes of users - scheduled air carriers (except air
taxis), scheduled air taxis, and all other aircraft operators."
In December 1968, the FAA adopted these restrictions, calling
it the "high-density rule."' 4 The rule applied only to the highdensity airports (John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, Newark, Chicago
O'Hare, and Washington National), but the FAA maintained
that it would add overly congested airports to the high-density
15
list if necessary.
"In the preamble to the rule, the FAA advised that the rule
should not be viewed as the permanent solution to the air congestion problem and that it would be kept under continuing review and modified as circumstances required or permitted."' 6
While the FAA amended the rule in February of 1969 and set an
expiration date of December 31, 1969, the FAA was forced to
extend it because congestion and delay persisted.' 7 While the
rule was not extended to other airports, the FAA did remove
Newark International Airport from high-density status in 19 70.8
The rest of the high-density airports remained subject to restrictions.' 9 In 1973, the FAA finally announced that the slot restrictions at O'Hare, John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Washington
National would remain for an indefinite period. z
11 Eileen M. Gleimer, Slot Regulation at High-Density Airports: How Did We Get
Here And Where Are We Going?, 61 J.AIR L. & CoM. 877, 878 (1996).
12 See id.; Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1572.
1"Gleimer, supra note 11, at 879.
14 High Density Traffic Airports, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,580 (Sept. 5, 1968).
15 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 878-79.
16

Id. at 880.

17

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1573.

18 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 880.

19See Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1573.
Gleimer, supra note 11, at 880.

20
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The high-density rule did not contain the specifics, and the
FAA did not provide rules as to how the limited slots would be
allocated beyond designating a set number for each of the three
categories (scheduled air carriers, scheduled air taxis, and other
aircraft operators). 2 1 "In fact, the FAA expressly contemplated
that the airlines would voluntarily reach decisions to reduce
their schedules to the level required by the high-density rule
and noted that the airlines were already discussing schedule
changes pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Government.' ' 22 The carriers used Scheduling Committees to allocate
slots among themselves and carriers desiring to operate at highdensity airports. 23 Agreements reached by such committees
were submitted for approval to the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB"),24 which at the time had jurisdiction over the licensing
of U.S. and foreign air carriers engaging in air transportation
and related economic matters. 25 An approval by the CAB translated into antitrust immunity for carriers, and thus Scheduling
26
Committees could negotiate without fear of liability.
The success of the Scheduling Committees dwindled with the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.27 "Because of the requirement that schedule changes be voluntary, the schedule changes
could not be made unless there was unanimity among the affected carriers. '' 28 Clearly, unanimity was challenging when
those on the Scheduling Committee were asked to grant a slot
request to a competitor who would fly the same route at a discounted price. 2' Not only did the Scheduling Committees (purposely) act as a barrier to new entrants,30 but the committee
structure was not conducive to quick and efficient reaction to
the market changes stemming from deregulation.

23

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1573.
Id. at 1574.
Gleimer, supra note 11, at 881.

24

Id.

25

See 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1988) (repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 41309

21
22

(2000)).
Gleimer, supra note 11, at 881-82.
Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1574.
28 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 882-83.
29 See id. at 882.
30 See Sabel, supra note 8, at 780.
31 See Andrew B. Steinberg & James W. Tegtmeier, Dealing with Airport Congestion: The Regulatory Challenge of Demand Management, 19 AIR & SPACE LAw. 14, 15
(2005).
26
27
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A fight over landing slots at Washington National Airport
highlighted the problems associated with the Scheduling Committees32 In 1980, New York Air planned to expand service by

adding flights between Washington and New York. 3 The airline
therefore requested twenty slots (spread out over peak hours) at
Washington National and LaGuardia. 4 Not surprisingly, the
Scheduling Committees were reluctant to hand over their slots
to a competitor, and FAA intervention became necessary. 5 The
FAA handed over eighteen of the twenty requested slots to New
York Air by taking slots from other carriers.-6 Some of the carriers forced to give up their slots filed suit against the FAA.37 But
the court in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt upheld the
FAA's action and stated that the slot reallocation was legitimate,
procedurally sound, and with a rational basis."
Following the FAA intervention in Washington, the legitimacy
and authority of Scheduling Committees came in to question. 9
As the FAA began making plans to address the confusion, the air
traffic controllers' strike of 1981 demanded a shift in focus.4"
In order to face the air traffic paralysis caused by this strike,
the FAA substituted the high-density rules with the National Air
Traffic Control Contingency Plan. This later became known as
the Interim Operation Plan, and through this, it was possible to
enforce restrictions at twenty-two of the busiest airports, thus re-

ducing the carriers' scheduled operations by twenty percent. 4

During this time, the FAA tested a system whereby slots could be

traded between carriers with FAA approval. 42 After the forty-two
day trial period, "248 slots were traded with a market price that
varied from $12,000 to $500,000 per slot."4 3
32

See Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1574.

33 Id.
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37 Id.
38 Id. at 1574-75 (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v.Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1318
(8th Cir. 1981)).
39 See id. at 1575.
40 Id.
41

Id.

42

Id.
Id. (citing U.S.

43

DEP'T OF TRANsP. REPORT TO CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE

HIGH-DENSITy RULE 26

(1995)).
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In 1984, the Interim Operation Plan restrictions were lifted,
and the high-density rule came back into effect.4 4 The same
problems that existed before the air traffic controllers' strike
still remained: congestion and inefficient Scheduling Committees. 4 5 But the success of the temporary slot trading did not go
unnoticed, because Congress began considering ways to permanently incorporate slot trading into the high-density rule.4 6
C.

THE BUY-SELL RULE

In December 1985, the FAA adopted the "buy-sell rule" for
slot trading.4 7 The rule allowed air carriers and commuters to
sell slots at the four high-density airports.4 ' Unlike the trial rule,
the buy-sell rule "permitted non-air carriers to hold slots-something which is significant for carriers wishing to use their slots as
security as well as communities that may wish to ensure the preservation of service to a high density airport. '" ' 9 The most significant provisions of the buy-sell rule include the "grandfather
clause," the exemption for essential services ("EAS") and international services, the "use it or lose it" provision, and lotteries
for open slots. 50
First, the grandfather clause may have been the most controversial provision of the rule because it dealt with the means by
which air carriers and commuters received the initial allocation
of slots. 5 1 It allocated slots to air carriers and commuters already
holding permanent slots on December 16, 1985.52 Those on the
losing end of the grandfather clause, primarily small carriers
and new entrants, objected to the rule. Their objections were
based on the fact that those grandfathered in already had "economic and practical advantages.""
The transportation department responded to this criticism by
stating that such initial benefits were necessary in order to establish a buy-sell system and at the same time, minimize any difficulties that could affect service. In addition, the transportation
44 Id.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 1575-76.

47 Id. at 1576.
48 Id.
49 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 887.
50

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1576-77.

51 See Gleirner, supra note 11, at 890.
-52

Id. at 887.

53 Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1576.
54 Id.
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department claimed that the "grandfather clause" was in effect a
recognition of the investment and commitment that these carripersonnel, equipment,
ers had made in the past concerning 55
communication networks, and planning.
Second, to counteract the windfall incumbents received
under the grandfather clause and to create a pool of slots for
new entrants and smaller carriers looking to expand, the FAA
proposed a one-time five percent lottery.5 6 O'Hare, LaGuardia,
and Washington National carriers had to forfeit five percent of
their slots, and all these slots went into a pool. 57 New entrants
(carriers just entering the market) and limited incumbents (carriers with a limited amount of slots, which at O'Hare was less
than eight slots) did not contribute to the pool. 58 Instead, the
new entrants and limited incumbents were the beneficiaries of
the pool slots. 59 Certain exemptions on slots that would be withdrawn from carriers were made for international flights and
slots deemed necessary by the Department of Transportation for
essential services (or service to remote areas). 60
The FAA set out procedures for the five percent withdrawal
lottery. 6 ' Importantly, the FAA mandated slots in peak hours be
contributed so that favorable slots (throughout the day) would
62
be available for new entrants and the limited incumbents.
Next, the buy-sell rule implemented a "use or lose" provision
to open up slots for those seeking to enter or expand their market at the high-density airports.6 3 The provision mandated carriers to use their slots for a minimum amount of time (initially
sixty-five percent, 64 but the amount65 moved up to eighty percent), or they would lose their slot.
To monitor slot usage, the FAA required that reports be filed
fourteen days after the end of each two month period, with the
obligation to file the report imposed on the holder of the slot. If
55 Id.
56 Gleimer,
57

58
59
60

supra note 11, at 890.

Id.
See id.
Id.
49 U.S.C. §§ 41714(a)-(b) (2000).

61 See Special Slot Withdrawal and Reallocation Procedures, 51 Fed. Reg. 8632
(Mar. 12, 1986).
62 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 890.
64

Id. at 889.
Id. at 889 n.49.

65

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1577.

63
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a review of these reports indicated that the minimum usage6 6 requirements were not met, the FAA could withdraw the Slot.
The FAA maintained that the slots did not come with property rights and insisted that they could be withdrawn at any time
by the FAA.67 In fact, the high-density rule could be repealed (if
congestion problems improved) and airlines would have no
property loss claim for useless slots under their control.68 In
part, the FAA did not want airlines to think of the slots as containing property rights because it envisioned slots being put towards the most efficient use.6" In other words, the FAA believed
that airlines would return slots to the lottery if they were not
being used or not being used efficiently.70 However, the buy-sell
rule worked better than the FAA had anticipated in creating a
market for slots. 7 Slots became valuable and no one wanted to
hand them back to the FAA uncompensated.7 2
The FAA retained ultimate control over the slots. It maintained that "[t] he FAA has the right to create, eliminate or withdraw slots for any reason unless they are allocated to essential
services (EAS) or international services" (which were both
outside of the high-density rule slot allocation system) .73 In order to deal with which slots would be used "to fulfill ... EAS
obligations, the FAA assigned by lottery withdrawal priority
numbers to each slot. ' 74 Those small carriers who operated on a
small number of slots did not have to participate in the withdrawal lottery.7 5
Gleimer, supra note 11, at 889.
In re McClain Airlines, Inc., 80 B.R. 175, 178 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987).
68 Id.
69 See In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating the FAA's
argument that "slots are not property of the carrier to which they are allocated,
but rather operating privileges subject to absolute FAA control"); Hardaway,
supra note 4, at 64 (stating that the FAA believed the slot market would "improve
efficiency").
70 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 64-65.
66

67

71

See id. at 58-59.

See, e.g., Gull Air, 890 F.2d at 1257-58, 1260-61 (disallowing bankrupt airline
to sell its slots for $80,000 because the FAA had the authority to withdraw an
airline's slots when it failed to comply with the FAA regulation mandating slots be
used at least sixty-five percent of the time over a two-month period); In re Braniff
Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that the FAA could recover slots from an airline that was in bankruptcy because the slots were not
property of the bankruptcy estate).
73 Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1576.
74 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 888.
72

75 Id.
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THE SLOT MARKET CREATED BY THE BUY-SELL RULE

While the FAA maintained that slots were not property, slots
became very valuable. The market value of slots varied greatly
depending on "the airport, the time allocated, the season, the
category of operators able to use it (air carriers or commuters),
and other factors linked to availability of gates."7 6 Other factors
that might affect a slot's value include the size of the aircraft
permitted in the slot and other operational restrictions such as
noise abatement procedures. 7
Some reported sales from
1990-1991 include: twenty-one slots at O'Hare were sold to
United Airlines for $60 million; eight slots at LaGuardia were
sold to USAir for $6 million; American Airlines bought twelve
LaGuardia slots and ten Washington National slots for over $21
million; and Continental bought thirty-five slots at LaGuardia
for $54 million.78 It has also been reported that slots have
reached the two million dollar price range at both O'Hare and
LaGuardia airports.79 Such a high value makes sense given that
United has reported that a slot worth $2 million at O'Hare generates over $5 million in revenue.8"
The FAA exercised little control over the sale, lease, and exchange of slots. 8 For the most part, the FAA approved transactions so long as the administrative requirements were met. 2
Such requirements included: (1) the slot was from the transferor's then-approved FAA base; (2) there was written evidence
of the transferor's consent; and (3) the recipient had to refrain
from using the slot until written confirmation had been received
from the FAA. 8" While this information is maintained in FAA
records, the commercial details of a sale or trade are not approved or tracked by the FAA.8 4 Rather than using the FAA,
airlines used the Air Transport Association (the U.S. airlines'
trade association) as a broker or clearinghouse for slot exchanges.8 5 Therefore, reports of sales were somewhat specula76

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1579.

77 Id.
78 Id. at 1580.

79 See id. at 1579, 1580.
80 Gleirner, supra note 11, at 901-02.
81 See id. at 897.
82 Id.

83 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.221(a)(2)-(4) (2008).
84 Gleimer, supra note 11, at 903.
85 Keith G. Debbage, Airport Runway Slots: Limits to Growth, 29 ANNALS OF TOUR-

ISM RES. 933, 940 (2002).
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tive since information primarily came from other sources, such
as reports to the Securities Exchange Commission or bankruptcy litigation. 6
The FAA's plan was that airlines would freely and voluntarily
sell slots that they were not using, but it turned out that airlines
were willing to hold on to slots no matter the cost. 7 Slots had
more than the reported monetary value, because holding a slot
was preventing a new entrant from competing; in effect, they
gave slot holders a major competitive advantage."8 Carriers still
had to meet the use-or-lose requirements, but they did this by
leasing out slots so that competitors could not gain permanent
slots.8 9 Carriers would "'park' excess air carrier slots with their
affiliated commuter airlines or code-sharing partners to keep
them out of the hands of their competitors."9 One study by the
Department of Transportation followed the dwindling slot market and found that sales between unrelated carriers fell "from
110 per quarter in 1986 to 28 per quarter in 1987 to 12 per
quarter in 1988."'" The buy-sell rule was heavily criticized for
while making new entrants
making the large carriers stronger
92
and smaller carriers weaker.
Congress reacted to the criticism in the 1994 FAA
Reauthorization Act by allowing for slot exemptions for new entrants providing service to high-density airports (with the exception of Washington National) .3 Specifically, the Act authorized
the Secretary of Transportation to grant an exemption for a new
entrant carrier where the exemption was in the public interest
and exceptional circumstances required it.94 The requirement

of exceptional circumstances proved to be an extremely high
standard as very few exemption requests were granted.95 The
fact that a route was already in service by another carrier precluded a finding of exceptional circumstances.9 6 In 1996, however, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") delivered
a report (that had been commissioned by the 1994 Reauthoriza86
87

Gleimer, supra note 11, at 900-01.

88

Id. at 908.
at 910.

Id. at 907-08.

89 Id.
90 Id.

91Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1581.
93

Gleimer, supra note 11, at 910.
See 49 U.S.C. § 41714(c) (2000).

94

Id.

95
96

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1582.

92

See id.
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tion) entitled Airline Deregulation: Barriers to Entry Continue to
Limit Competition in Several Key Domestic Markets.9 7 Not surprisingly, the report found that the new carriers' inaccessibility to
slots prevented them from entering the high-density airport
markets. 98 The report criticized the Department of Transportation's unwillingness to grant exemptions through a narrow interpretation of the exceptional circumstances requirement. 99
The limited view taken by the Department of Transportation
discouraged both market entry and applications for exceptional
circumstances.100
In response to the GAO report, the Department of Transportation stated that it would no longer use the narrow interpretation of "exceptional circumstances" and would construe the
term in a way that encouraged competition. 1 ' The Department
of Transportation laid out guidelines for meeting the criteria.
The new criteria would allow an exemption not only for applicants who would offer new, non-stop services that did not exist,
but would grant an exemption where a carrier "demonstrated
potential to offer low-fare competition [and there was only] a
single carrier service and the market could support competition,
or the existing carriers [did] not provide meaningful
competition." 102
E.

AIR-21

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 aimed to encourage
competition in the airline industry and break down barriers to
97

See U.S.

Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

LATION: BARRIERS TO ENTRY CONTINUE TO LIT
MESTIC MARKETS

Id.

at 2.

99 Id.

at 8.

98

GAO/RCED-97-4,

AIRLINE DEREGU-

COMPETITION IN SEVERAL KEY Do-

(1996).

10 Id. at 9.
1(0
102

Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1583.
Id.
The first decision showing this new interpretation of the rule had
been applied concerned a request by Frontier Airlines. The Department of Transportation recognized the need to introduce a
new service and create competition with an incumbent service and
more specifically a low cost service. The DOT judged that substantial benefits can be achieved through increasing competition at
slot-constrained airports in situations where consumer would be
able to obtain significantly lower fares in non-competitive or underserved markets.
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entry."0 3 However, it could not break down the slot system because there were not enough slots to go around; slots at highdensity airports were extremely hard to obtain (even when buying through the buy-sell rule).*0
The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment Reform Act for the
21st Century ("AIR-21") was passed in April of 2000.105 AIR-21
phased out the high-density rule (and slot restrictions) at LaGuardia, Kennedy, and O'Hare.' °6 Slot restrictions were to be
eliminated at O'Hare airport byJuly 1, 2002, and at the LaGuardia and Kennedy airports byJanuary 1, 2007.107 While Chicago
and New York both anxiously awaited the AIR-21 slot expirations, they have yet to be completely eliminated." 8 While the
high-density rule was phased out by AIR-21, congestion and delays at these historically crowded airports have meant that the
FAA has had to continually keep tabs on these airports and allocate slots through flight caps.1 °9
II.

A CONGRESSIONAL HUB CARRIER SLOT
PREFERENCE AT O'HARE

To understand the current proposed rule for a hub carrier
slot preference at O'Hare, it is important to first examine the
background of the specific FAA rules instituted at O'Hare.
A.

BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A

HUB CARRIER PREFERENCE

1.

OHare's Design and Congestion
O'Hare is a vital transportation link for the Midwest region, for
North America, and for the world. It is the only airport in the
United States that is the hub of two major airlines. Serving 47
scheduled passenger airlines and 23 cargo carriers, O'Hare pro-

103

Id. at 1585.

104

Id.

105
106

Id. at 1586.
Id. at 1587.

107

Id.

See Lorene Yue, FAA Extends O'Hare Caps, Encourages Competition, CHI. Bus.,
Aug. 23, 2006, http://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=21824; Air Travelers Association Opposes Air Slot Restrictions, Slot Auctions, and Congestion PricingProposals, as the New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee Concludes Its Proceedings, Bus.
WIRE, Dec. 11, 2007, http://allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-government/5329196-1 .html.
10- See, e.g., Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International
Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,386 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
pt. 93).
108
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vides nonstop service to 127 domestic and 48 international destinations. In part because Chicago is the largest population and
economic center in the middle of the country, O'Hare "plays an
important role in the National Airspace System (NAS) as a dual
airline hub, a major mid-continent market for nearly every major
airline, and a key international gateway."
O'Hare is not only one of the busiest airports in the world.
Unfortunately, recently it has also become one of the most congested. Its delay record is at least twice as bad as that of the next
two airports that suffer from excessive delays, Atlanta and Newark. Nearly 70,000 airport operations at O'Hare were delayed in
2004, for a total of almost 4,000,000 minutes. As the [O'Hare
Modernization Act] states, "[t] he reliability and efficiency of air
transportation for residents and businesses in Illinois and other
' 0
[s]tates depends on efficient air traffic operations at O'Hare." ]
Because most passengers at O'Hare are connecting to other airports, the effects of O'Hare's congestion are felt around the
country and the world."' According to the FAA's Record of Decision, "O'Hare has consistently been the number one problem
related to delays with the National Airspace System in the
United States today."1'1 2
Much of its delay and congestion is blamed on O'Hare's poor
runway design."' The design contains an "outdated configuration of seven intersecting runways (which include a 'runway triangle' created by the three original intersecting runways that lie
north of the present terminals) by creating six parallel and two
crosswind runways.""' 4 The intersecting runway design means
that "the ability to use one runway
is limited by whether an air'' 5
craft is using any of the others."
2.

Slot Allocation in the Face of Congestion

As previously discussed, O'Hare was designated a high-density
airport when the high-density rule first came about in 1968.1"6
Although initially temporary, the rule was made permanent and
went through significant changes after deregulation of the in110St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 634

(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting O'Hare Modernization Act, 620
65/5 (West 2003)).
111 Id.

Id.
113 Id. at 620.
114 Id.
112

115 Id.
116

Gleimer, supra note 11, at 878.

ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN.
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dustry.1 ' 7 However, after the buy-sell rule was adopted in 1985,
the next major change did not come until 2000. In 2000, Congress relaxed slot restrictions and made the following changes at
O'Hare:
(1) Beginning May 1, 2000, exemptions were granted to airlines to provide air service to small airports using aircraft with a
seating capacity of less than seventy-one;' 8
(2) New entrant or limited
incumbent air carriers were granted
11 9
thirty slot exemptions;
(3) Beginning May 1, 2000, slots
were no longer required to
2
provide international air service;' 1
(4) BeginningJuly 1, 2001, the slot control restrictions applied
only between 2:45 p.m. and 8:14 p.m.;' 2 and
(5) Slot restrictions were lifted entirely after July 1, 2002.122
In phasing out the HDR, however, Congress recognized the possibility that there could be an increase in congestion and delays
at the affected airports. Therefore, in the section that phased
out the rule, it made clear that "[n] othing in this section ...shall
be construed . . . as affecting the Federal Aviation Administra1 23
tion's authority for safety and the movement of air traffic.
On July 1, 2002, the high-density rule phase-out at O'Hare
went into effect and slot restrictions were lifted. 24 At first, congestion problems were kept at a minimum; however, this minimum is credited to the decrease in passenger travel subsequent
to the September lth terrorist attacks.125 The lull in congestion
did not last long. By 2003, O'Hare's hub carriers, American Airlines and United Airlines, added a large number of operations
and re-timed other flights, which resulted in congestion and delay. 126 From April 2000 through November 2003, the hub carriers significantly increased the number of scheduled operations
117

Id. at 880.

ll849 U.S.C. § 41717(b) (2000).
119Id. § 41717(c).
120
121
122

Id. § 41717(e).
Id. § 41717(a).
Id. § 41715(a).

123 Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International Airport,
71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,383 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93)
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41715(b)(1)).
124
125

Id.
Id.

126 Id. The report explains that "American increased its scheduled operations
at O'Hare between the hours of 12 p.m. and 7:59 p.m. by nearly 10.5 percent.
Over the same period, United increased its scheduled operations at O'Hare by
over 41 percent." Id.
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(by over fifty percent combined) but reduced their overall seat
capacity. 27 This combination of more flights and less people on
those flights translated into devastating congestion. "By Novemhad the worst on-time performance of any maber 2003, O'Hare
128
jor airport.
Dealing with growing frustrations from passengers and carriers, Congress took action to reduce O'Hare delays in the form
of 49 U.S.C. § 41722.129 The statute:
[A]uthorized the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to request that scheduled air carriers meet with the FAA to discuss
flight reductions at severely congested airports to reduce overscheduling and flight delays during hours of peak operation if
the Administrator determines that it is necessary to convene such
a meeting and the Secretary determines that the meeting is necessary to meet a serious transportation need or achieve an important public benefit.13 °
Not surprisingly, in 2004 the Secretary of Transportation and
the FAA Administrator found that such a meeting was necessary
at O'Hare.1 3 '
However, meeting separately with agency officials beforehand, United and American voluntarily reduced their scheduled
flights. 3 2 This way, American and United could work out their
schedules without subjecting themselves to unknown (and possibly more restrictive) regulation. Hence, the meeting was unnecessary, and the FAA issued an order implementing the agreed127 Id. Regionaljet operations of 375 per day were added by O'Hare's two hub
carriers. Id.
Overall, American and United added over 600 regional jet operations per day. At the same time as they added regional jet operations, they reduced mainline jet operations. The result was actually
a decrease in seat capacity by each carrier at O'Hare of more than
5.5 percent from April 2000 to November 2003 while flights increased by an average of 150 per day. In November 2003, more
than 40 percent of American's and United's O'Hare flights were
operated with regional jets, many to large and medium hubs.
Id.
128 Id. O'Hare's arrivals were on time only 57% compared to the FAA goal of
82%. Departures were on time only 67% of the time compared to 85% at other
major airports. Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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upon reduction of five percent of scheduled operations during
peak hours. 13'

While the flight reductions did have an impact, it was not
enough to ease the congestion at O'Hare.' 34 Delays at O'Hare
represented more than a third of all delays in the United
States.1 35 FAA officials began discussions with American and
United to address the continued congestion. 36 As a result, both
American and United agreed to additional schedule reductions
to decrease delay and congestion.13 7

The resulting order

required:
[B]eginning no later than June 10, 2004 ... (1) [an] additional
schedule reduction of 2.5 percent of each carrier's total operations in the 1 p.m. through 7:59 p.m. hours including arrival reductions during specific times; (2) a reduction in the number of
scheduled arrivals in the 12 p.m. hour; and (3) reductions to
continue through October 30, 2004.38

Before the additional 2.5% reduction went into effect, delays
reached an all-time high of 14,495 in May 2004.19 American's
and United's compliance with the agreed-upon additional reduction in June eased delays somewhat, but not enough to satisfy the FAA. 140 At the heart of the problem was that American
and United were the only parties to the agreed-upon reduction.1 4 ' Hence, other airlines had continued to add flights while
the hub carriers cut their schedules. 1 42 This fact made the hub
carriers less willing to continue to make reductions.' 4 3 Realizing
they had reached an impasse, the Secretary of Transportation
and the FAA Administrator called for scheduling the previously
deferred reduction meeting."
133 Id. Specifically, "this reduction was to be effective between 1:00 p.m. and
8:00 p.m. for six-months, beginning no later than March 4, 2004." Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.

Id.
Id. (citing Operating Limitations at Chicago O'Hare Int'l Airport, Docket
FAA-2004-16944-3 (2004)).
139 Id.
140 Id.
13'7
138

141

Id.

142

Id. at 51,383-84.

143

Id. at 51,384.

144

Id.
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On August 4, 2004, the meeting between the Department of
Transportation and the carriers convened.1 4 5 The meeting resulted in further flight reductions by United and American and
146
slight increases for new entrants and limited incumbents.
United and American agreed to reduce arrivals by about 5%
during peak hours, bringing their total agreed flight reductions
to 12.5% each. 4 7 Based on information obtained through the
meetings, the FAA issued a comprehensive order that lowered
the maximum number of landing slots from 120 to 88 per hour
throughout most of the day.1 48 The flight caps went into effect
"in November 2004 on a temporary basis [but were] extended
three [more] times to alleviate congestion at O'Hare."' 4 9
The Final Rule (the third extension of the O'Hare flight caps)
was issued on August 29, 2006.'15 The rule went into effect October 29, 2006, and is scheduled to terminate on October 31,
2008,151 at which point the new runway under the O'Hare Modernization Plan should be available "to accommodate more than
' 52
50,000 additional forecast operations annually."'
The rule restricted arrivals from 7:00 a.m. through 8:59 p.m.
13
on weekdays and from noon through 8:59 p.m. on Sundays.
The number of arrival slots during those periods was cut to
eighty-eight per hour and to fifty during each thirty-minute period from 7:00 a.m. through 7:59 p.m. 54 The rule allowed increased slots (ninety-eight) between 8:00 p.m. and 8:59 p.m.
Monday through Friday and Sunday, with the fifty-per-half-hour
limitation applying.' 55 The FAA also retained the "use or lose"
provision requiring airlines to use slots eighty percent of the
56
time or lose them.
145Id. According to the report, the meetings were conducted with each carrier
separately for antitrust reasons. Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.; Yue, supra note 108.
149 Yue, supra note 108. See also Congestion and Delay Reduction, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 51,384.
150 Congestion and Delay Reduction, 71 Fed. Reg. at 51,382.
1M'14 C.F.R. § 93.21 (2008).
152 FAA Imposes Final Slot Rule at Chicago O'Hare,ATW ONLINE, Aug. 24, 2006,
http://atwonline.com/news/story.html?storylD=6183.
153 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.23(a)(1), (a)(2).
154 Id. § 93.23(1).
155 Id. § 93.23(2).
156 Id. § 93.31 (a).
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The rule also gave a slot preference to new entrants and lim57
ited incumbents in order to promote competition at O'Hare.1
The rule specified that if O'Hare is able to add one or more
flights per hour (above the eighty-eight slot cap) without causing delays, those landing rights would go to new entrants or incumbents first. 1 58 The eighty-ninth and ninetieth flight slots

would be awarded via a lottery system to new entrants or limited
incumbents (those with eight or fewer arrivals per day). 159 Slots

for the ninety-first flights and beyond, should the FAA allow
them, would be awarded via lottery to current airlines operating
out of O'Hare.

160

The FAA estimated that the Final Rule would reduce delays at
O'Hare by thirty-two percent, generate $475.6 million in savings
through 2008 (including $212.7 million for airlines), and cost
less than $1 million.161

United Airlines, American Airlines, the city of Chicago, and
members of the Illinois Congress had lobbied the FAA to open
any new capacity at O'Hare to any carrier because awarding it
only to new or small carriers "created a disincentive for the air162
port's two [hub] carriers to invest in capacity improvements.'
However, consumer advocates lauded the FAA for its pro-competition stance. One editorial supported the FAA rule:
United and American control 83% of the flights at O'Hare. And
while they lost more flights than others when the caps took effect
two years ago, the limits also cemented their hold on the airport.
Carriers like JetBlue, which might offer passengers more flight
options and163lower fares, were boxed out or prevented from
expanding.

3. Promise of Expansion: The OHare Modernization Plan
In 2001, the U.S. Senate Commerce, Energy, and Transportation Committee held hearings to examine the congestion and
delays at O'Hare and the subsequent ripple effect it had on na157 See Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,388 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
93).
158 14 C.F.R. § 93.30(h).
159Id. § 93.30(c).
1-0Id. § 93.30(d).
161Congestion and Delay Reduction, 71 Fed. Reg. at 51,398.
162

Yue, supra note 108.

Editorial, FAA Rule Rightly Promotes O'Hare Competition, CHI. Bus., Aug. 28,
2006, http://,w.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/mag/article.plid=26375.
163
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tionwide aviation delays. 164 "During the course of these hearings, the Committee strongly hinted that if the City of Chicago
and the State of Illinois did not reach a decision on airport expansion before September 1, 2001, Congress would likely
intervene. "165
Soon after the hearings, the city announced a plan to expand
O'Hare known as the O'Hare Modernization Program
("OMP")

166

"The OMP proposed to correct some of the ineffi-

ciencies created by the airfield's outdated configuration of seven
intersecting runways."'1 67 "On December 5, 2001, the Mayor of
Chicago and the Governor of Illinois announced that they had
reached an agreement on the central components of the pro1 68

posed OMP."'

Under the OMP, O'Hare's existing seven runways will be
reconfigured into a more modern parallel layout and a new west
terminal with additional gates will be added. 169 The OMP will
cost a projected $6.6 billion (in 2001 dollars) to be funded by
Passenger Facility Charges, General Airport Revenue Bonds,
Federal Airport Improvement Program funds, and, of course,
O'Hare's two major hub carriers. 7 ' The hub carriers, American
and United, have already committed to pay $2.9 billion for
phase one of the O'Hare project. 1 71 While the carriers said that
they would not commit more funds until the first two runways
open in October of 2008, the carriers have entered into phase
two funding discussions with OMP officials. 7 2 Phase two is now
expected to cost more than $4 billion (in 2007 dollars).7
The O'Hare Modernization Plan is designed to incrementally
increase capacity starting in 2008.174 The addition of the first
See St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 620
(7th Cir. 2007).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 [d.
168 Id.
169 Aaron Karp, Ryan & Daley Agree on O'Hare Expansion & New Airport, AIR
TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 6, 2001; O'Hare Modernization Program, Learn
About OMP, http://tinyurl.com/61hvap (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
170 Learn About OMP, supra note 169. See also Greg Hinz, A New Push at
O'Hare,CHI. Bus., Nov. 12, 2007, http://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id
=27089.
171 Hinz, supra note 170.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International Airport,
71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,384 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
164
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new runway in 2008 is projected to allow for "over 50,000 additional forecast operations with an average annual delay per aircraft no higher than exists today."' 7 5 In 2010, OMP expansion is
forecasted to increase by 90,000 operations "with a decrease in
average annual delay per aircraft of approximately 33% below
today's delay per aircraft at O'Hare."' 76 The final phase, to be
completed in 2013, is expected to "accommodate approximately
1.12 million annual forecast operations (an increase of more
than 140,000 annual operation[s] over today's activity level)
per aircraft nearly 70% below towith an average annual ''delay
77
aircraft."
per
delay
day's
On September 30, 2005, the FAA approved the revised Airport Layout Plan and other federal actions related to the implementation of the OMP. 178 Despite the initial slowdown
stemming from an injunction preventing the OMP from acquiring land necessary for the runway expansion, 1 79 the injunction
has been thrown out and the O'Hare expansion is now on
track.180 With the new expansion getting closer to reality, the
fight for additional slots has already begun.181
B.

A HuB

CARRIER SLOT PREFERENCE

In September 2007, the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure released House Report 331 explaining
the 2007 FAA Reauthorization (House Bill 2881), which has
passed in the House and is now pending in the Senate. 8 2 Representative Jerry Costello (D-IL) inserted bill language into the
report directly addressing O'Hare flight caps and, more importantly, who should get preference on landing slots once O'Hare
expands and the flight caps are lifted. 183 The bill language is
not binding on the agency; however, it could influence the FAA
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51,397.

179 See St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 621
(7th Cir. 2007).
180 See Hinz, supra note 170.

id. See also H.R. REP. No. 110-331, at 115 (2007).
GovTrack Bill Status of H.R. 2881: FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007, http:/
/www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpdbill=hl 10-2881 (last visited Aug. 29, 2008).
183 Paul Merrion, UAL, American Muscle Out O'Hare Competition, CHI. Bus., Oct.
20, 2007, http://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=26833.
181 See

182
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in interpreting the rule in that it provides evidence of legislative
84
intent.'
The first part of the report language expresses the Committee's dislike of caps at O'Hare and pushes the FAA to focus its
efforts on long term expansion. 18 5 It states:
The Committee believes that the cap on flights currently
placed on O'Hare International Airport is a short-term solution
to manage congestion and delay until enhancements from the
O'Hare Modernization Plan ("OMP") begin to come on-line.
To mitigate congestion and expand capacity at O'Hare International Airport, the Committee believes the FAA should implement long term solutions that utilize the increased capacity and
benefits expected from the OMP. 18 6
The next part specifically addresses the need for a hub carrier
preference and reasons why such preference should be given to
hub carriers (American and United) based on their prior voluntary flight reductions.' 8 7 It states:
Further, as new capacity becomes available at O'Hare International Airport, preference should be given to hub carriers, given
that they temporarily agreed to a 12.5 percent reduction in their
peak-hour schedules to reduce congestion in 2004, and little has
been done to restore or redistribute capacity to accommodate
for that voluntary reduction. 8
American Airlines and United Airlines are obviously pleased
with the report language granting them a preference for additional slots created by the OMP.' 8 9 An American spokesperson
was quoted as saying, "This [provision] would ensure that before
new entrants or other carriers were granted more capacity, we
would be made whole again."' 90 In addition to the provision
serving as a sort of restitution for previous flight reductions,
American and United have also argued that they should receive
preference on new runway space because they have paid for
most of the expansion. 9 '
The other O'Hare airlines, as well as many consumers, are not
happy about the report language granting the two already-domi184

Id.

185

H.R. RP. No. 110-331, at 115.

186
187
188

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Merrion, supra note 183.

189
190 Id.
191

Hinz, supra note 170.
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nant carriers preference over additional slots. 19 2 Many had envi-

sioned the expansion as translating into a chance for discount
airlines to enter the O'Hare market and drive prices down. 9 ' A
Chicago editorial expressed the frustration stating, "[W] e consider [the provision] blatantly unfair to the 38 million travelers
who use O'Hare every year. Allowing United and American to
keep control of O'Hare would rob travelers of194a key potential
benefit of the expansion-price competition."'
While the FAA Reauthorization Bill has yet to go before the
Senate, U.S. Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) is reported to be
sympathetic to American and United's argument that they
should receive preference for new runway space.' 95 It is possible
that he could push the Senate to amend the FAA Reauthoriza1 96
tion to include the O'Hare hub carrier slot preference.

A.

III.

SLOT ALLOCATION THEORIES

How

WOULD A RUNWAY PREFERENCE WORK?

The language in House Report 331 directs only a result that
"preference should be given to hub carriers,"' 9 7 and provides
absolutely no guidance on how the FAA would go about obtaining such a result. This begs the question, "How would such
a preference work?"
The default at non-slot controlled airports (which is most airports) is the "first come-first served" method where those with
landing rights simply wait their turn. Such a system has proven
entirely unsuccessful in the past at O'Hare. But, if the FAA stays
true to its word and lifts the caps at O'Hare in October 2008
(and the Congressional Report seems to urge that the FAA follow through in doing so by saying that short term caps are not a
solution), then it is possible that O'Hare would revert to this
system. Under this system, however, a preference of any kind is
unworkable because the whole system is based on "first comefirst served." Since the size of an airplane makes it impossible to
simply jump to the head of a runway line, it seems that the
192 See Merrion, supra note 183. According to the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (June 2006-June 2007), eighty-four percent of O'Hare's passengers are
flying on United, American, or their regional jet partners. Id.
193See id.
194Editorial, Travelers Lose ifUAL, AA Control O'Hare, Ci. Bus., Oct. 29, 2007,
h ttp://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/mag/article.pl?id=28698.
195Merrion, supra note 183.
196 Id.
197H.R. REP. No. 110-331, at 115 (2007).
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House Committee Report's insertion of a hub carrier preference implies that some sort of slot control will be necessary at
O'Hare subsequent to the runway expansion. Several different
slot allocation methods could be employed.
1.

High-Density Rule Allocation

Under the high-density rule, the initial allocation of rights was
doled out based on the slots airlines were already using. The
FAA simply made an administrative determination of how many
slots each airline was entitled to and made the allocation. Slots
were not bought or sold, they were not auctioned off, and there
was no lottery to determine allocations.
The high-density rule was and is extremely disliked by the airlines-both small carriers who are not able to expand under it
and larger hub carriers who are forced to reduce flights. No
one seems to be in favor of reverting back to a high-density rule
system, but it seems that the Congressional Report most closely
resembles an allocation similar to that under the high-density
rule. Under the high-density rule, allocations came without payment but simply because airlines had used the slots in the past,
and here the argument is that the hub carriers should get a preference (presumably, in this situation, without payment) because
they had the rights in the past.
2.

Auctions/Open Market

Another way of allocating slots is to simply let the free market
sort things out: airlines bid on slots and the slots go to the highest bidders. While this is seemingly an efficient allocation of resources, analysts do not agree on whether an auction allocation
works in practice. "Some argue that a market system puts slots
However, others argue that beto their highest valued use." '
cause having rights to a slot necessarily deprives a competitor
airline of using the slot and competing in the market, it behooves larger airlines to maintain rights to slots even if they do
so at a loss.' 9 9 One analyst demonstrates how a misallocation
can occur in an auction/open market situation:
If a larger firm outbids a smaller firm for a slot or refuses to
sell at marginal cost, the following results occur: 1) a barrier to
entry is created, and the incumbent firm will face a more steeply
declining demand curve, thus enabling it to set prices at a profit198 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 66.
199 See id. at 65.
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maximizing and misallocative level above marginal cost (but
equal to marginal revenue), and 2) large firms will, in order to
avoid losing a slot under the "use it or lose it" clause of the "buysell" rule, use that slot for a lower valued flight even if it does not
cover variable costs; it will do so in order to preserve the oligopoly premium for its other flights. The result is a misallocation of
slot resources.2 °°
While larger carriers embrace the idea of an open market
where slots could be easily purchased, their admiration for this
system likely stems from the fact that it allows them to control
the market: they can pay more for slots (even those they do not
need) and prevent competitors from obtaining slots necessary
for competition. While American and United would likely embrace this system if it were to be implemented after the O'Hare
expansion, the FAA would be unlikely to relinquish all control
of the slot system. 20 ' Additionally, as stated above, the House
Committee Report language of a hub carrier preference
presumes that there will be control over slots. In a free market
system, the FAA would be out of the picture and not granting
preferences to any airline.
3.

Lottery

Under the buy-sell rule of 1986, five percent of slots were to
be forfeited by large carriers and placed in a pool from which
new entrants could obtain slots. That five percent pool was to
be allocated by lottery. While this sort of system made sense in a
post-airline-deregulation world, where many new entrants were
coming into the airline industry, it does not make sense when a
preference is to be given only to hub carriers. Because there
would only be two airlines in the pool, any attempt to employ a
lottery would essentially be similar to an administrative determination under the high-density rule.
4.

Scheduling Committees

As discussed above, Scheduling Committees were used prior
to deregulation of the airline industry. The Committees
reached decisions through unanimous decision-making. This
unanimity, however, became impossible after deregulation.
Id.
See Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,389 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
93).
200
201
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While Scheduling Committees are widely used in Europe,20 2
such a system would be extremely difficult to reinstitute. And,
because preferences would be impossible to implement within a
decision-making body made up of competitors, this is certainly
not the slot allocation method contemplated in the House Committee Report language.
B.

1.

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING HUB CARRIER PREFERENCE

Property Right

The first argument a supporter of a hub carrier preference at
O'Hare would put forth is that slots are property. 2 3 The
O'Hare hub carriers would thus be able to claim a property
right in the slots they had given up in order to reduce congestion. Important to this argument would be a recognition that
the slots the hub carriers "voluntarily" gave up were actually
forced from the carriers under threat of a scheduling meeting
(resulting in an unknown FAA ruling).2°4

While the FAA has insisted that slots are not property, there
are several bankruptcy cases holding that slots do constitute
property despite the FAA's disclaimer.20 5 For example, the
court in In re McClain Airlines, Inc. held that slots are property.20 6
In that case, McClain Airlines had received eight arrival and departure slots at O'Hare, but the airline went bankrupt shortly
after going into business due to certification difficulties.20 7 The
FAA claimed that during the course of the airline's business, it
failed to meet the "use or lose" requirement (then requiring a
minimum use of sixty-five percent), but the debtor refuted that
he failed to meet the "use or lose" requirement and claimed the
slots as property. 2 8 The McClain court held that the FAA's

claim that slots are not property is not determinative because
the aim of the buy-sell rule ("to 'minimize government intervention' and provide 'maximum reliance on market forces to deterIan Jones, Ivan Viehoff & Phillipa Marks, The Economics of Airport Slots, 14
FISCAL STUD. 37, 40-41 (1993).
203 See Maffeo, supra note 10, at 1578; Gleimer, supra note 11, at 902-07.
204 See Congestion and Delay Reduction, 71 Fed. Reg. at 51,383.
205 See generally In reMcClain Airlines, Inc., 80 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987);
In re Am. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 52 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
206 McClain Airlines, 80 B.R. at 179.
207 Id. at 176-77.
208 Id. at 177.
202
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mine slot distribution'") is not reconcilable with the209 contention
that freely traded slots do not constitute property.
In addition to bankruptcy courts' recognition of a property
right in slots, financial institutions' use of slots as collateral demonstrates a recognition of a property interest. 210 While a prudent creditor will supervise such an arrangement closely (and
demmonitor "use or lose" provisions), a slot's value as security
21
onstrates that it is treated as having a property right.

1

Finally, the reality is that slots are very valuable. There is a slot
market, and slots have been bought and sold for upwards of a
million dollars.21 2 Even if the FAA denies that there is a property
right, it is clear that there is some sort of claim to a slot. In In re
Gull Air, Inc. (later overturned by the First Circuit Court of Appeals), the judge described Gull's claim in a slot:
[P]ressed to the wall, (Gulls' slot) would be a property right. But
I don't know that I have to find that it is a property right in its
total sense. It's a license in which the debtor has a proprietary
interest since the regulation gives the debtor the privilege to sell
it.

2 13

While a landing slot has characteristics of a property right,
even if it is not classified as such, the benefits of a hub-and-spoke
system can be used to justify a hub carrier preference.
Benefits Stemming from Hub-and-Spoke System
Today the hub-and-spoke system is the dominant system in
U.S. airports.214 Under this system, airlines pick up passengers
at smaller spoke cities and fly them to a main airport (the
hub). 2 15 The advantage of this system is that passengers,
whether located at the hub or at a spoke, can easily access a wide
range of destinations.2" 6 For the spoke city passenger, the hub
system provides access to more routes, because the passenger
2.

209Id.at 179.
210

See Gleimer, supra note 11, at 902-07.

211

Id.
Id. at 900-03.

212

213 In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1257 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis omitted);
see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,606 (Feb. 8, 1987) (treating landing slots as a
government license for income tax purposes).
214 Airline Competition: Clear Skies or Turbulence Ahead?: Hearing Before the S.Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, 106th Cong. 38 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Donald J. Carty, Chairman, President, and CEO,
American Airlines).
215 See Sabel, supra note 8, at 775.
216 Hearing, supra note 214, at 35.
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can get to a hub and have his or her pick of destinations from
the hub. 2 17 Also, at one hub there are usually many airlines (all
connecting to their own hub city); thus, competition in the
spoke cities keeps a check on prices. 2 "8 As Donald J. Carty, the
(now former) Chairman, President, and CEO of American Airlines stated while testifying in front of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee regarding the hub-and-spoke system:
For passengers living in hub cities, the hub and spoke system
provides frequent service, numerous nonstop destinations and
vigorous competition. For all the talk about the alleged evils of
hubs, nearly every city in America would love to be one. Huboriginating passengers enjoy non-stop service to scores of destinations-far more service in terms of both frequency and destinacould support without the "feed"
tions than the local population
21 9
traffic from other cities.
While Chicago O'Hare certainly does offer various routes,
there are also studies demonstrating that prices at O'Hare are
not increased due to its status as a hub. First, O'Hare is the only
hub airport with two (rather than one) hub carriers, which
means that the airlines must compete against one another for
fares. 22° Another study found that Chicago O'Hare has the "second highest penetration of low fare carriers out of 11 major hub
average fare of any of
cities and it also has the lowest weighted
22 1
the 11 major hub cities examined.
A hub-and-spoke system also has the very important benefit of
contributing to the local economy. With a hub airport comes
not only jobs, but a carrier that is invested in the local airport
and its success. The hub carriers are essential to the O'Hare
expansion and are contributing much of the $6.6 billion bill (in
2001 dollars).222
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O'Hare Soon to Be Last Dual Hub for Major Carriers, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Ass'N NEws, Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.atca.org/singlenews.asp?item-ID=21 74&
comm=0.
221 See Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,389 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
93).
222 Learn About OMP, supra note 169.
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1.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST HUB CARRIER PREFERENCE

No Property Right
In arguing against a hub carrier preference, one would assert

that hub carriers have no property interest in slots that they gave
up or that they were initially given (by "grandfathering" in their
slots). A hub carrier has no claim over a slot because the FAA is
authorized to take it back. Additionally, while not binding, the
FAA has asserted time and time again that slots are not property
rights. There is also a good deal of case law supporting the proposition that slots do not come with property rights.223 In In re
Braniff Airways, Inc., a bankruptcy court found that a slot did not
constitute property because the value in the slot came from the
government; the slots had no intrinsic value in themselves.224
Similarly, in In Re Gull Air, Inc., the court denied slots property
right status because the interest could be reclaimed at the will of
the FAA. 225 In fact, the FAA could decide to completely end the
high-density rule and slot allocation at all airports, and slots
would have no value at all.226
2.

No FAA Authority

In the report accompanying the Chicago O'Hare Final Rule,
the FAA set forth its authority as the following:
The FAA's statutory authority to regulate the navigable airspace
does not expressly direct the agency to consider any specific factor in allocating airspace rights. Absent such expression, we
must look to the public interest in determining criteria for assignment of these Arrival Authorizations. In considering the
public interest, we are guided by the policy goals prescribed for
the Secretary and the pro-competition policies followed by Congress in adopting legislation on matters such as slot exemptions
and airport grant programs. The courts have approved the Sec-

retary's reliance on the pro-competition polices in allocating
slots under the HDR.
As we articulated in the August 2004 Order, Congress has set
forth a policy of promoting deregulation and competition in the
223 See, e.g., In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1264 (1st Cir. 1989); In reBraniff
Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d. 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1983).
224 See Braniff 700 F.2d. at 942.
225 See Gull Air, 890 F.2d at 1261-62.
226 See Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges, 73 Fed. Reg. 3310 (Jan. 17,
2008) (proposing a landing fee system based on congestion pricing; such a system could lead to doing away with the slot system all together).

2008]

"SLOT" PREFERENCEAT O'HARE

639

airline industry by means of2 2the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
7
and subsequent legislation.
From the FAA's own statement of its authority, it appears that
its policies are to be guided by the public interest and the procompetition principles set down by the Secretary of Transportation. Since a hub carrier preference would be the opposite of a
pro-competition stance, effectively preventing smaller carriers
from expanding (or even operating, in the case of a new entrant), it is arguable that the FAA does not have authority to
enforce such a provision.
3.

Fairness and Competition

Contrary to the hub carriers' fairness argument, smaller carriers can argue that basic principles of fairness and equity demand that a hub carrier preference be abandoned. With a
preference, hub carriers have demonstrated cut-throat tactics to
box smaller carriers out of the market. Hub carriers have been
known to hold on to non-profitable slots and operate at a loss
just to prevent another airline from taking the slot and entering
the market. Smaller carriers would argue that almost any alternative (open market/auctions, lotteries, or congestion pricing)
would be preferable to a hub carrier preference.
A hub carrier preference would reduce smaller carriers' presence in the market, and even if it did not drive the smaller carriers out of business, competition would decrease and airplane
ticket prices would thus increase. The FAA referenced the importance of smaller/discount carriers to keep pricing down,
saying:
Entry, particularly by low-fare airlines, is an essential ingredient for airline competition. Studies of airline industry competition under deregulation have concluded that low-fare entry has a
substantial impact on price and service. For instance, Southwest
initiated service into Philadelphia in May 2004, and since that
time the fares in Philadelphia have shifted from being 19 percent
higher to 2 percent lower than fares in comparable domestic
markets (comparing the Fourth Quarter 2003 to the Fourth
Quarter 2004). A policy that fails to provide any special treatment for new entry, the approach recommended by United and
other larger incumbents, would curtail competition that leads to
227 See Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,382, 51,388 (Aug. 29, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.

93).
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substantial fare reductions, increased service, and enables more
people to travel.2 28
This illustration exemplifies the negative impact that a lack of
competition has on prices and on consumers. While higher
prices might be a positive thing for the hub carriers, it will not
be good for anyone else.
IV.

SHOULD O'HARE HUB CARRIERS GET
A SLOT PREFERENCE?
A.

No

PROPERTY RIGHT IN SLOTS

First, while there is a split of authority in bankruptcy courts as
to whether slots constitute property, the elimination of the highdensity rule at O'Hare in 2002 and the possible total elimination
of slots at O'Hare (after expansion) mean that slots will likely
not be considered a property right in the future. In fact, slots
might not have any value in the future.
But if American and United did not have a property right in
slots that they gave up to reduce congestion, then why is Congress proposing that they be made whole again? First, it seems
that Congress is using terms of fairness rather than talking in
terms of property rights. Congress may be intimating that those
carriers who voluntarily worked with the FAA and gave up the
most slots should not be put last in order in receiving additional
slots. But the most important factor in why Congress said it was
only fair for American and United to get first preference in slots
is the hub carriers' role in funding the O'Hare Modernization
Plan. So, the basic rule that Congress is promulgating is: if you
pay for it, you will be rewarded.

B.

O'HARE EXPANSION Is Top PRIORuITY

The one thing that all parties interested in the hub carrier
preference at O'Hare agree on is that the O'Hare expansion (or
the OMP) is essential. The congestion, delay, and national frustration caused by O'Hare's dysfunctional runway and setup have
been well-documented. The OMP must be completed for
O'Hare to continue to thrive as an airport, and the primary
financers of the project are the hub carriers. The question then
becomes, if allowing the hub carriers (American Airlines and
United Airlines) first preference on O'Hare slots would secure
OMP financing, is it worth the sacrifices to new entrants, limited
228
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incumbents, and ultimately the consumer? For O'Hare, the answer to this question may be yes. As the only dual hub in the
United States, O'Hare is likely the only airport that can and
should support a hub carrier preference. With two strong carriers at the airport, there will be competition (assuming no illegal
agreements are made between the two). While it is an unpopular stance to hand over precious runway space to the alreadydominant carriers, such a move will secure the future of the
airport.
O'Hare is a unique airport in a unique situation. There are
few airports that are in as dire a need to modernize and expand
as O'Hare. Even among the highly congested airports, there are
few that have the physical capacity to expand (as LaGuardia is
surrounded by water and Washington National has no space in
which to expand). Moreover, O'Hare is the only airport with
two hub carriers that can remain competitive even with a hub
carrier preference. Such a preference, although backward in
thwarting competition, may actually help O'Hare grow. While it
might help O'Hare, such a preference could cause a detriment
to other airports. The moral, then, is that slot preferences are
best applied to the specifics of each airport.
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